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RECENT TRENDS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
CONTEMPT
The power of a court to hold an individual
in contempt for "misbehavior" which obstructs
the smooth functioning of the judicial process
is one which grows in significance as court-
room disorders become more common. Several
recent decisions attempted to clarify and define
this ambiguous concept in meaningful terms.
Whether they were successful is open to seri-
ous question.
In United States v. Snider,' the appeals
court had before it a classical "political trial"
which led to contempt of court charges against
the defendant. The defendant was a Quaker
war protestor who, along with his wife, quietly
refused to rise when the judge entered the
courtroom. 2 For this action, Snider and his
wife were held in contempt by the trial court
judge.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed the convictions for contempt, holding
that the refusal to rise was not misbehavior
which obstructed the administration of justice'
In the eyes of the majority, the defendant and
his wife did not attempt to make the trial a
forum or circus for the expression of their
own political beliefs. Their actions were appar-
ently very respectful at all times and no real
'502 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1974).
2 Snider was being tried for violation of 26
U.S.C. § 7205, which punishes false or fraudulent
withholding from statements on income tax re-
turns. He had claimed three billion dependants on
his tax return so as to avoid any tax payments
which would support the military establishment.
The court of appeals reversed the conviction im-
posed by the district court because they found no
intent to deceive.
3 18 U.S.C. § 401 was the statute which the de-
fendants were charged with violating. It reads as
follows:
A court of the United States shall have power
to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its dis-
cretion, such contempt of its authority, and
none other, as-
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its pres-
ence or so near thereto as to obstruct the ad-
ministration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in
their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful
writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.
courtoom disruption occurred.4 In reversing
this conviction, the Fourth Circuit refused to
adopt the rule that a simple failure to rise was
misbehavior within the meaning of the statute
in question.5 The failure to stand was not re-
garded as a material obstruction to the func-
tioning of the court; other means than stand-
ing could be utilized to mark the beginning
and the end of the session.
A dissent by Judge Widener emphasized the
fact that the majority's decision would serve
to undermine and impair the administration of
justice. In the eyes of the dissent, policy dic-
tated that at least the convictions for criminal
contempt be upheld. Since the trial attracted
significant public attention, Widener felt that
the Sniders did indeed make the trial a forum
for the expression of their political views. He
went on to say that the majority's decision
would result in the trial judge's losing any dis-
cretion to punish for this type of conduct.
Another limitation upon the trial judge's use
of the contempt power can be found in United
States v. Columbia Broadcasting System. That
case involved a ban on courtroom sketches im-
posed by a district court judge upon the de-
fendant-television network.7 C.B.S. violated a
verbal order of the trial judge and published
the drawings made by its artists. The same
judge who issued the orders then tried the
contempt case himself and found the television
network guilty.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
versed the convictions because it was consid-
4 When ordered to stand, the Sniders responded
by saying that they could not, in good conscience,
stand. No further disruption of courtroom decorum
occurred.
5 At least one circuit has reached the opposite
conclusion. See Robson v. Malone, 412 F.2d 848(7th Cir. 1969). But see In re Chase, 468 F.2d
128 (7th Cir. 1972).
6 497 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1974).
7 In a companion case, the ban on publication of
the courtroom sketches was held unconstitutional.
In United States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974), the court of ap-
peals held that the publication of these drawings
did not pose an imminent threat to the fairness of
the trial sufficient to overcome the policy against
prior restraints on first amendment rights.
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ered improper for the same person who issued
the original order to try the resulting contempt
action; a trial by another judge was required
under these circumstances. The appearance of
justice demanded another trier of fact; even
the hint or appearance of bias was to be
avoided in a criminal contempt proceeding."
Since one of the issues to be proven at the
'contempt proceeding was the content of phe
-judge's own verbal order, the court reasoned
that it was improper to allow a person who, in
'essence, should be a witness at the trial to sit
in judgment. The power of a trial judge to
bass upon the guilt of a person in a contempt
proceeding where the judge himself was a
principal actor was restricted severely by this
dlecision.
In contrast to the Snider and C.B.S. cases,
which exhibited a tendency to limit the use of
the contempt power, is the case of In re La
Mfarre9 which expressed, in dicta, a desire to
expand the powers of a trial court. A convic-
tion for contempt of court was overturned by
the Sixth Circuit on the grounds that a "re-
'quest" for an insurance company manager's
presence was not clearly an order. The trial
judge wished to compel the attendance of the
defendant at a pretrial conference aimed at
settlement.'0 Because of a lack of clarity in the
verbal orders of the trial judge, the court of
'appeals held that the defendant could not be
'held in contempt where he may not have been
-put on actual notice that his freedom was in
jeopardy if he failed to comply.
This holding in itself does not expand the
:authority of a trial court judge in the contempt
,area, but a lengthy section of dicta does. The
defendant questioned the authority of the dis-
trict judge to force his appearance at a pretrial
conference." The circuit court stated that, al-
though this was apparently a question of first
impression, the trial court did possess the
8 Cf. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455
(1971) - Grizell v. Wainwright, 481 F.2d 405 (5th
Cir. 193). These cases were referred to in the
court's opinion.
0 494 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1974).
10 It is unclear from the facts given on appeal
-whether the defendant was only "requested" to at-
-tend or whether he was actually ordered to attend.
-1 It should be noted that the company which
-the defendant represented (the Insurance Company
-of North America) was not an actual party to the
1ending litigation; rather, it stood ready to indem-
nify one of the litigants.
power to compel attendance of a non-party at a
pre-trial settlement conference. The court said
that La Marre could not refuse a lawful order
to attend such a conference to discuss the mat-
ter of settlement.' 2
The case of United States v. Profitt'3 like-
wise expanded the power of a trial judge in
conflict with the trend of Snider and C.B.S.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit up-
held a contempt conviction for passive resist-
ance to a court proceeding. The defendant was
held in contempt for refusing to take part in
any of the criminal proceedings pending
against him. Profitt deliberately refused to co-
operate in the process of jury selection; evi-
dently he adopted a strategy of obstructionism
in order to delay his trial.' 4 The defendant
"pretended" not to understand simple questions
put forth from the bench and refused to coop-
erate in a court-ordered psychiatric examina-
tion.
Although recognizing that the defendant's
actions were mild in comparison to more vio-
lent episodes of recent years, the circuit court
nevertheless upheld the power of the trial
judge to punish this conduct by incarceration.
The interests of efficient and speedy adminis-
tration necessarily gave the district judge
great discretion in the handling of this type of
problem, and the reviewing court was ob-
viously hesitant to ignore the decision of the
trial judge who was present during these
incidents.' 5 Consequently, the court upheld the
judge's ruling as within his inherent power
to maintain order and dignity within the
courtroom. 16
12 But since the order was not clearly worded,
the court reversed the defendant's conviction for
contempt.
13 498 F.2d 1124 (3d Cir. 1974).
14 The court of appeals characterized his con-
duct as passive resistance through non-cooperation.
'1 It was recognized that the record was unre-
sponsive in parts; it did not always indicate truly
contemptuous conduct by the defendant (e.g., the
repeated statements that he simply "did not under-
stand" the questions asked). The majority rea-
soned that the record did not always reflect the
smirk or the sneer which the trial judge would
perceive.
18 This decision should be contrasted with the
holding in Snider, supra, which held that a failure
to stand could not be punished. Obviously, the
Profitt court took a more expansive view of the




As a result of the United States Supreme
Court decision in Miller v. California1 7 a num-
ber of state obscenity statutes have recently
been challenged for their alleged failure to
comply with the standards enunciated in that
landmark decision. Four statutes were con-
strued within the last six months; two were
voided and two upheld.
Perhaps most noteworthy was the result in
Miranda v. Hicks,' which ruled the California
statute in question unconstitutionally vague.
The statute involved had previously provided
the starting point for the Supreme Court's re-
definition of obscenity in Miller.
A three judge panel of the central district of
California held that the statute' 9 did not meet
the Miller requirement that sexual conduct be
specifically defined in the statute itself or by a
court which "authoritatively construed" it. Au-
thoritative construction of an obscenity statute
which was otherwise overly vague might pre-
serve it. Since the Miller decision, the Califor-
nia court had construed the statute in People
v. Enskat20 and upheld the statute.
The federal district court held that the Cali-
fornia statute, as construed by the local court,
still did not accurately define the prohibited
sexual conduct as required by Miller. Fair no-
tice would not be given to a potential defend-
ant by the Enskat ruling or from the statute
itself.21 Even with the additional interpretation
of the statute, the court found that there was
no "fair notice" of what the state of California
permitted or prohibited with regard to obscen-
ity. While the state court's interpretation may
have liberalized the statute to a certain extent,
it was not adequately construed so as to give
fair notice as to what was constitutionally pro-
hibited.
17 413 U.S. 15 (1972).
Is - F. Supp (C.D. Cal. 1974).
19 CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 et. seq., as amended,
1974.
2033 Cal. App. 3d 900 (1973), - P.2d -
(1974), 109 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1973).21 The California court in Enskat concluded
that: (1) only "hard core" pornography is prohib-
ited; (2) nudity absent a sexual activity is not ob-
scene; and (3) the material must contain a
"graphic description" of sexual activity. The dis-
trict court felt that these standards were as vague
and ill-defined as the language of the statute, and
consequently, the fair notice test of Miller was not
met.
A similar result was reached in Massachu-
setts. Commonwealth v. Horton2 voided a
state statute which outlawed the sale of "ob-
scene and impure" magazines while a compan-
ion case, Commonwealth v. Capri2 s found un--
constitutional a statute which made possession-
of "obscene" material a crime. The reasoning
in both of these cases was similar to that
shown in Hicks; the statutes failed to meet the7
specificity standard of Miller.
The majority in Horton refused to follow-
the same reasoning used by the California su--
preme court, in which the statute was authori-
tatively construed by the local court. Rather,
the Massachusetts supreme judicial court felt
that new legislation and not judicial rewriting-
of an obviously infirm statute was demanded
by the circumstances. 24 To furnish a judicial
interpretation of the state obscenity statutes.
which would "specifically define" the sexual
conduct forbidden by the legislation would, in
the opinion of the majority, force the court to,
legislate. The court plainly wished to avoid a
judicial rewriting of an already ambiguous
statute. Explicit new legislation was demanded
by the court.
Recent decisions in Alabama and New
Hampshire ran contrary to the results obtained
in California and Massachusetts, and obscenity
statutes in those two states were upheld.
In Pierce v. State,25 the Alabama supreme
court held that a state obscenity statute con-
formed with the dictates of Miller. The defend-
ant book store owner did indeed have adequate
notice that his conduct was violative of the ob-
scenity law. The court accepted the Supreme
Court's invitation to "authoritatively construe"
the state statute, unlike the Massachusetts court
in Horton and Capri.26 The Alabama court con-
strued Miller as allowing the ban of material
22 Mass. , 310 N.E2d 316 (1974).
23 Id.
24 Justice Braucher, along with two colleagues,
dissented in both cases. His position was that the
court should construe the statute in such a way as
to conform to the Miller standard. In his mind,
the statutes in question had received the authorita-
tive judicial construction suggested by Miller and
new legislation was not necessary.
25 292 Ala. 473 296 So. 2d 218 (1974).
26 This task was partially accomplished by an
earlier decision of the Alabama judiciary. See
McKinney v. State, 287 Ala. 648, 254 So. 2d 714(1971).
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which the state proved was lacking in serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value. This
view was contrasted with earlier holdings
which required that allegedly obscene material
be "utterly" without such value.
Any potential vagueness of the statute was
held to have been clarified by prior judicial
construction.27 The court further held that the
community standards referred to by the Su-
preme Court in Miller meant statewide stand-
ards and not just those of the local community
where the trial occurred. Any other reading of
that term would result in a host of practical
problems which the court wished to avoid.28
New Hampshire's obscenity statute was
authoritatively construed in State v. Hard-
ing.29 The state supreme court upheld the
constitutionality of the statute"0 but dismissed
the conviction of the defendent for selling three
allegedly obscene publications. The court rec-
ognized that Miller demanded that the pros-
cribed depictions or descriptions of sexual con-
duct had to be defined by applicable state law
as written or authoritatively construed. The
court proceeded to shade in the statute in areas
where ambiguity remained.
However, the court reversed the conviction
of the defendant because of the great confusion
in this area of the law. The majority reasoned
that Harding did not have sufficient notice or
warning of the fact that the materials he was
selling were in violation of the law as it ex-
isted at the time of the alleged sale. The Roth
test,31 which was the law until the Miller deci-
sion was handed down, simply did not provide
requisite notice to potential defendants and as
a consequence, the court dismissed the complaint
against Harding.
27 The McKinney case, supra note 26, was cited
as defining the obscene nature of photos similar to
those sold by the defendant.
28 It was considered harmless error for the
judge at the trial of the defendant to instruct the
jury that the standard to be applied was that of
Mongomery, Alabama, where the trial was held.
29 N.H. -_ 320 A2d 646 (1974).
ao The New Hampshire statute, R.S.A. § 571
A: 1 (Supp. 1972), was modeled after section
207.10 of the A.L.I. Model Penal Code Conse-
quently, it was much more specific in its definition
of obscenity than many less modern statutes deal-
ing with obscenity.
31 This concept of obscenity was developed in
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
CONFESSIONS
A growing trend toward admitting confes-
sions made by suspects under unusual or
trying circumstances is found in several recent
decisions. The apparent justification for an ex-
panded admissibility of such evidence may be
that courts are increasingly reluctant to dis-
card what is often very valuable evidence.
Indicative of the shifting attitude of courts
towards the voluntariness of confessions is
United States v. Johnson 2 where the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dropped its "be-
yond a reasonable doubt" standard in deter-
mining voluntariness and replaced it with a
"preponderance of the evidence" test. In so
doing, the court affirmed a conviction for bank
robbery based at least partially upon a confes-
sion which was ruled admissible by the district
judge. The Fourth Circuit had previously re-
quired the higher degree of proof of voluntari-
ness before a confession was admitted into
evidence against a defendant.33 The court con-
cluded that the recent Supreme Court decision
in Lego v. Twomey3 4 dictated the move to a
preponderance standard and an abandonment
of the stricter standard.35 Interpreting the
Lego decision as one based upon a constitu-
tional footing, the court felt that its own
standard had to fall in the interests of uni-
formity among the federal courts. Conse-
quently, the court affirmed the district judge's
decision to admit the defendant's confession even
though its voluntariness was proven only by a
preponderance of the evidence.
The case of Commonwealth v. Jones16 re-
sulted in the admission of a confession as vol-
untary even though police deception took place
during the interrogation. The defendant was
arrested and charged with robbery and murder.
Z2 495 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1974).
33 See United States v. Inman, 352 F.2d 954
(4th Cir. 1965), which established the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" test in the Fourth Circuit. The
standard was not adopted on constitutional
grounds, but rather upon the court's supervisory
power over district courts within the circuit. Aside
from the courts of the District of Columbia, the
Fourth Circuit was apparently the only one to re-
quire this higher degree of proof.
34 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
35 Specifically, the court read footnote 16 of the
Lego majority opinion as requiring a simple pre-
ponderance test for admissibility of allegedly vol-
untary confessions.
s . Pa , 322 A.2d 119 (1974).
19741
COMMENTS
While in custody, police officers deceived him
into believing that one of his cohorts had
implicated him in the crime and turned
informant.37  Following this trickery, Jones
signed a statement confessing his role in the
crime. On appeal, the defendant challenged the
voluntariness of his statement.
The Pennsylvania court stated that it would
invalidate a confession if it was produced as a
result of a subterfuge that would tend to pro-
duce an untrustworthy confession. Further-
more, if the trickery was so reprehensible as to
offend basic societal notions of fairness, any
confession so obtained would not be ad-
missible.38 Viewing all the facts of this situ-
ation, the court characterized the confession as
voluntary. The majority said that although it
did not condone deliberate misrepresentation
of facts, the totality of the circumstances would
allow admission of the defendant's written con-
fession.
An examination of the totality of the cir-
cumstances surrounding another confession led
to its admission in Castleberry v. State.39 The
court thus affirmed a murder conviction based
at least in part upon the defendant's written
statement of confession. On appeal, Castleberry
contended that the confession was the product
of overwhelming psychological pressures and it
was actually induced by the police.40 He stated
that he was psychologically coerced by police
actions which relied upon the defendant's ob-
vious susceptibility to suggestions and trust in
the two detectives handling the case.
The Oklahoma court of criminal appeals re-
37 The record apparently indicated that the co-
defendant had never implicated Jones or offered to
turn informant.
38 The court also mentioned that an intelligent
waiver of fifth amendment rights was demanded
before a confession would be considered truly vol-
untary.
39 522 P.2d 257 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1974).
40 Evidently, the defendant was questioned a
number of times prior to his confession which oc-
curred seven days after the murder of his wife
and children. The actual confession took place fol-
lowing a conversation with a minister, arranged by
one of the police officers. Miranda rights were oc-
casionally given to the defendant.
jected these claims totally. Relying primarily
upon Cidombe v. Connecticut, 1 the court held
the confession voluntary. It was admitted that
there may have been some psychological in-
ducements, but the majority believed this did
not alter the basic voluntary nature of the de-
fendant's statements. In the opinion of the ma-
jority, not all confessions made while in cus-
tody would be the product of an overborn will;
occasionally, remorse would compel one to
speak out against his own interests.42
Following the apparent trend toward admit-
ting confessions made under unusual circum-
stances was the decision of the Kentucky court
of appeals in Britt v. Commonwealth.4 3 The
court upheld a conviction which resulted from
a confession obtained while the defendant was
severely intoxicated.4 4 The court felt that the
concept of voluntariness was not applicable
when a confession was made while under the
influence of drugs or liquor. Rather, the court
believed that the basic question had to be
whether or not the confessor was in sufficient
possession of his faculties to give a reliable
statement.
45
The truth of the statement made by Britt
was not strongly suspected by the court. At the
pre-trial suppression hearing, the defendant did
not even attempt to show that that he did not
understand the meaning of the statements he
had made while intoxicated the night before.
The court was not willing to hold that the com-
bination of intoxication and police custody
must always add up to a violation of due proc-
ess of law in the admission of an "involun-
tary" confession.
41 367 U.S. 568 (1969).
42 It should be noted that Justice Brett dissented
vigorously. It was his belief that police coercion
produced the confession and consequently, it should
be excluded under the Culombe rationale.
43 512 So. 2d 496 (Ky. Ct. of App. 1974).
While in custody at a police station, the de-
fendant confessed that he drove a hit-and-run ve-
hicle. At the time the statements were made, his
blood-alcohol content registered at .22 percent.
45 The court held that the burden was on the
prosecution to show that the confessor possessed
these attributes at the time of the confession.
[Vol. 65-
